Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965)

1967

G. Dayton Hughes v. Richard D. Hooper : Brief of
Respondent

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Strong & Hanni and Lawrence L. Summerhays; Attorneys for
Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Hughes v. Hooper, No. 10700 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4902

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

I

I

I

l.

/ ,:t'
IN THE SUPREME COURT~·~.-~: .. /~
OF THE STATE OF UTA.B1~h:
.-~<

.····~

-,

G. DAYTON HUGHES,
PioMt,tiff ON], .Af"P6lbet,

vs.
RICHARD D. HOOPER,
Deftmdamit am4t Respo'lt4.,. ·, ;., ~·: ;f

BRIEF OF RES .

<

~

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

.

I
\

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT________________________

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL------------------------------

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS --------------------------------

2

ARGUMENT -------------------------------------------------------------------POINT I.
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT OF
THE TRIAL COURT ARE SUSTAINED
BY THE EVIDENCE AND THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR
OF THE PLAINTIFF ------------·-···-------------------------

5

CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------

10

CASES CITED

Badger v. Clayson, Utah, filed January 3, 1967,
Case No. 10517 ---------------------------------------------------------Klenk v. OregO)f Short Line R. R. Co., 27 Ut.
428, 76 P. 214 --------------------------------------------------------------

I
I

I
~

5

8
7

Martin v. Stevens, 121 Ut. 484, 243 P. 2d 747 ------------ 5, 8
Mallard v. Sims, 173 Wash. 649, 24 P. 2d 70________________

7

Nielson v. Mauchley, 115 Ut. 68, 202 P. 2d 547__________

5

Toomers Estate v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,
121 Ut. 37, 239 P. 2d 163._________________________________________

5

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
G. DAYTON HUGHES,
Plaintiff wnd Appellant,
Case No.

vs.

10700

RICHARD D. HOOPER,
Def end ant and Respondent.

BRIEF O,F RESPONDENT
S'rA TEJ\IENT OF ·THE NATURE OF THE CASE
·This is an action by the owner-driver of an automobile for injuries and automobile damage arising out
of an automobile accident which occurred on Sunday, the
7th day of .June, 1963, at approximately 9 :00 a.m. at an
open intersection in Provo, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LUWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable Joseph E.
N('lson sitting with a jury. The jury brought in a verdict
of no cause of action predicated upon its finding that
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in
not keeping a proper lookout.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment of the
lower court and judgment in plaintiff's favor as a matter
of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The verdict of the jury was in favor of the defendant
and against the plaintiff and the defendant will, therefore, set forth the facts as they must be vie~wed on appeal
favorable to the verdict of the jury.
The accident on which the plaintiff premises his cause
of action occurred on Sunday the 7th day of June, 1963,
at appro:X.i:mately 9 :00 a.m. at the intersection of 100
South and 600 West Streets in Provo, Utah. There were
no regulatory traffic signs or lights controlling traffic
at the intersection for either driver.
The plaintiff was traveling in a northerly direction
on 6th West Street, and the defendant proceeding easterly on 100 South Street. On the southwest corner of the
intersection there stood a home (Defendant's Exhibits
12 and 13, and plaintiff's Exhibit 6), the north side of
which was approximately 33 feet from the south curb on
100 South Street and the front of which approximately
56 feet west of the west curb on 6th WPst Street. (See
plaintiff's Exhibit 6.) Plaintiff testified that there were
several cars parked along the south side of 100 South
Street beginning at a point approximately 30 feet west
of the west curb line of 6th West Street (R. 138) which
obstructed his view. Defendant did not recall seeing any
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vehicle parked on the south side of 100 South Street (R.
166-167).
From a point approximately 120 feet west and 120 feet
f;outh of the point of imvact each of the drivers could
have seen the other within those distances. (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 6) Plaintiff testified that he observed the parked
H'hicles as he approached the intersection (R. 73, 74) and
that they did obstruct his vision (R. 73). Plaintiff
approached the intersedion at a speed of approximately
20 to 25 miles per hour according to his own testimony
<R. 12, 137). Defendant testified that he approached
the intersection, also, at a speed o.f about 25 miles per
hour and in his proper lane of traffic (R. 164), and that
plaintiff was traveling at about the same speed as defendant. As defendant approached the intersection, he
looked first to the right and then to the left seeing no
traffic on either occasion and then glanced back to his
right again and saw the plaintiff's car at about the south
cross-walk at a time when his vehicle was then at about
the west cross-walk (R. 165). The defendant immediately applied his brakes (R. 165), skidded for about 10 feet
(R. 7), and struck the vehicle of the plaintiff in the right
side with the left headlight portion of the defendant's
vehicle striking the plaintiff's vehicle over the left wheel
well and the right headlight striking the left door of the
plaintiff's vehicle (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1). The two
\rehicles then proceeded in a generally northeasterly direction side by side and came to rest on the northeast
corner of the intersection.
'The investigating officer located the point of impact
:J,C\ ft•d Past of the west cross walk at the intersection
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(28 feet from W('St curhline) and 28 feet north of thP
south cross-walk at the intersection (18 feet from south
enrbline) and measured an additional 5 feet from the
fo1·,rnrd point of impact on }Jlaintiff's VPhicle to the
front of the plaintiff's vehiC'le indicating that the plaintiff's vehicle was 33 feet from the south cross-walk at
time of impact. The nearest west cross-walk line was 10
feet from the curb and the south cross-walk line 10 feet
from south curb. Each street was approximately 50 feet
wide (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6). Defendant recognized
that the cars parked along the south side of the intersection would constitute a hazard to his view (R. 140), and
further testified that there was only a fraction of a second for him to determine whether or not any cars were
approaching (R. 140, 141), and that there was just a
fraction of a second from the time he saw the defendant's
vehicle until the impact occurred (R. 142). Defendant
testified that plaintiff was looking straight ahead and
did not turn his head toward the defendant at any time
after he saw him (R. 166). Plaintiff further testified that
about one-third of his car \Vas in the intersection at the
time he saw the defendant's vehicle 15 feet from him
(R. 1±1-). He told the investigating officer he first saw
the Hooper vehicle at time of impact (R. 42).

The two ears entered the intersection at about the
same time (R. 165-166) and it was a close question as to
who had the technical right-of-way.
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ARGFMENT
POINT I.
THJ,_: VERDICT AND JUDGMENT OF THE
TRIAL COURT ARE SU~TAINED BY THE
EVIDENCE AND THE TRIAL COURT DID
NOT ERR. IN REFUSING TO DIRECT A
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAIN'rIFF.
The jury made an express finding that the plaintiff
was guilty of negligence in the operation of his vehicle
by not keeping a proper lookout and that he, therefore,
could not recover on his complaint.
The basic question involved in the appeal is, therefore, whether or not there was sufficient evidence of
plaintiff's failure to keep a proper lookout produced at
the trial to support the court's presentation of this issue
to the jury, and the jury's finding of contributory negligence upon the part of the plaintiff.
The question of contributory negligence is usually
for the jury and the court should be reluctant to take
consideration of this question of fact from it. Nielson v.
ilf ailchley, Utah 115 Ut. 68, 202 P. 2d 5-17; Toomers Estate
0·. Union Pacific Railroad Co., Utah, 121 Ut. 37, 239 P. 2d
1G3; Martin v. Stevens, Utah 121 Lt. -!8-1, 2-!i) P. 2d 7-1:7.
Plaintiff testified that he did not see the defendant
vd1icle until the defendant vehicle was already in the
intersection and when the vehicle was not more than
15 feet from the plaintiff vehicle. In fact the jury could
have found that plaintiff did not see the vehicle of the
defendant at all until impact. The investigating officer
5

testified that in the conversation he had with plaintiff
after the accident the plaintiff told him that he did not
see defendant's vehicle until the time of impact ( R. 42).
There was also evidence that the plaintiff did not look
at all because the defendant testified that he saw tlw
plaintiff vehicle when plaintiff's vehicle was at about
the south cross-walk as defendant was at about the west
cross-walk and the plaintiff was looking straight ahead
and did not turn his head tmvard the defendant at anytime after defendant saw the plaintiff (R. 166). By his
own testimony plaintiff did not look at all until he was
15-20 feet from the intersection which would place his
vehicle in the vicinity of the south cross-vvalk. The fact
that he left no skid marks at all certainly supports the
defendant's testimony and the plaintiff's that plaintiff
either did not see the defendant vehicle at all or until
a fraction of a second before impact. In fact, plaintiff
ks ti fiecl that when he first looked, there was only a fraction of a second between that time and the time of impact.
(By Mr. Summerhays to :Mr. Hughes)
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

Now you say there was not much time from
15-20 feet back to determine whether or not
there was a car there, is this corrc>,ct'?
It would only be a matter of a split second.
Fraction of a second.
Yes. (R. 140-14-1)

The plaintiff was aware of the fact that the greatrst
danger to him would he from a car coming from his left
in his line of traffic (R. 143), but he did not look until
he was 15-20 feet from the intersection by his own testimony.
6

If there were cars parked along the south side of
100 South Street, there was still some distance between
the north side of the house and the parked cars (33 feet
or more) and knowing that his view would be blocked
up close to the intersection placed a duty upon plaintiff
to look for approaching cars from a point in between the
house and the parked cars. He made no attempt to look,
though he saw the parked cars in advance and knew they
would constitute a hazard to his vision.

(Mr. Summerhays to :Mr. Hughes)

Q.

You knew then, that those cars constituted a
hazard to your vision, did you no·t1
A. I didn't have much time to analyze it. It 'vas
only a matter of split second or two.
Yes, but as you approached the intersection,
you could see that the cars were parked along
the intersection, could you not?
A. Yes.

Q.

Q.

A.

And you knew that they would constitute a
hazard to your view, did you not?
I would say that I knew that.

(R. 139, 140)

If the parked cars created a dangerous situation,
then plaintiff's duty was to use additional caution in
accordance with the existing conditions creating the
increased danger. Klenk v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co.,
27 Ut. 428, 76 P. 214; Mallard v. Sims, 173 \Vash. 649,
24 P. 2d 70. The amount of caution required by the law
increases, as does the danger that reasonably should be
apprehended.
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If the plaintiff wai'l going to rnsh lwadlong into th(•
intersection, he should have used every opportunity available to determine whether tlwre were any cars approaching. Orn_• can by carefully observing look through the
windows of parked cars for possible movt•nwnt of
approaching cars. Plaintiff failed in his duty in r<>gard
to all of these possibilities.
The fact is that the defendant's vehiele ·was approaching close to the intersection at the same time as
tlw plaintiff was approaching, and the car was there to
be seen. The plaintiff's duty is not fulfilled by merely
taking a quick glance, or none. He is charged with seeing
what is there to be seen, and it is a jury question as to
whether the vehicle of the defendant \ms there to lw
seen, \vhether plaintiff fufilled his duty in keeping a
proper lookout and whether his failure, if any, was a
proximate cause of the accident. 11!f artin v. Stevens,
supra; Karl TY. Badger 'l'. Paul Taylor Clayson, Utah,
filed January 3, 1967, Case No. 10517.
Plaintiff has submitted an extensive argument to show
that defendant was traveling at an exe(•ssivl~ s1>eed and
that plaintiff entered the intersE.'etion first. In answt>r
to said argument defendant points out some of the fallacit•s and weaknesses of th<> elaimecl facts and the
conclusions drawn therefrorn upon which plaintiff\; argument is based.
Officer Baum testified that in his opm10n the d('fendant was going 35--10 rniks per hour (R. 21). Ile
based this upon the 10 feet of skid marks whieh lw ob-
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se>rved plus the impact and the distance the cars traveled
after impact and the use of a skid chart (R. 21). Officer
Baum had only heen an officer for f:ight months at the
time the accident occurred (R. 18). He had had two weeks
training at the Utah Highway Academy at National
Uuard Camp covering all phases of a police officer's
duties (R. 18). He did not know even approximately how
many accidents he had investigated ( R. 19).

In making his calculations he did not

the
wheelbase of the car from the distance the car traveled
after impact (R. 31). The 4-7 feet the defendant vehicle
traveled after impact consisted of scuff marks, how many
lw was not sure (R. 36). During the last 19 feet the
hrn cars traveled he admitted they were rolling together
(R. 46). The officer also admitted that the speed of the
plaintiff's vehicle would have carried the defendant's
vehicle to the north and cause part of the scuff marks
(R. -±0), but he did not in fact take this into consideration
in computing the speed. He admitted that he just folt
like Mr. Hughes' speed was 20 miles per hour (R. 41),
and that it could have been calculated, but he didn't know
how to do it (R. 41). He actually went on Mr. Hughes'
statement. He at first gave Mr. Hughes a ticket for failme to yield the right-of-way but later after talking to
other officers decided not to press it (R. 23-24).
sub~tract

In connection with the witness Coon's testimony, he
assumed a speed of 20 miles per hour for Mr. Hughes
hecause this is the speed Mr. Hughes stated he was
going, and this is the speed the officer told Mr. Coon
Hughes was going (R. 54-). His subsequent calculation

of speed was determined from the position of the vehicles
after impact along with other factors, but the location
of the vehicles after impact as far as mcasnn'mcnts
\H•re concerned was never introduced into evidence (R.
70-71). His calculations werP, therefore, not based on
facts in evidence (R. 71).
Using the figures given him, however, he placed
the vehicles as coming into the intersection at a time
interval of .15 seconds apart or eight feet. The accuracy
of this finding was quite questionable, and the jury would
certainly have been justified in coming to some other
conclusion. They could have found actually that the
defendant entered the intersection slightly ahead of the
plaintiff.
Whatever their finding may have been on right-of-way
it is clear that they found him guilty of negligence for
failurP to keep a proper lookout.

CONCLUSION
The verdict of the jury is clearly sustained by the
evidence, and the court properly submitted the case to the
jury. The judgment of the court should, therefore, be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

STRONG & HANNI and
LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS
604- Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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